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Essay
INDUCED LITIGATION
Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie*
More judges, more courthouses, more funding.
-Judge Stephen Reinhardt, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit'
[T]he federal courts have functioned through wars, natural disasters, and ter-
rorist attacks. During times such as these, the role of the courts becomes even
more important in order to enforce the rule of law. To continue functioning ef-
fectively and efficiently, however, the courts must be appropriately staffed.
This means that necessary judgeships must be created and judicial vacancies
must be timely filled with well-qualified candidates.
-- Chief Justice William Rehnquist, U.S. Supreme Court'
We need, in addition to a little greed, more seats for judges
And we can't get em, unless the Congress budges.
For a decade they'ye not acted on the courts of appeals,
Ignoring all my suggested deals.
Today, Circuits one, two and nine,
Have more business than judges to opine.
Take the Ninth Circuit, where business has doubled
It's seventeen years since Congress could be troubled.
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I Is U.S. Justice System in a State of Crisis? Four Prominent Lawyers Examine Problems and Solu-
tions, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 23 (quoting Judge Reinhardt). In this ATLAINLJ sponsored sympo-
sium or question-and-answer session, Judge Reinhardt observed that there are three problems in the
federal court system, one of which is "the lack of sufficient judges to handle the volume of cases prop-
erly." Id.
2 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2001 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2002), available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2001 year-endreport.html.
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The wheels ofjustice are going to soon grind to a halt,
If Congress doesn 't get to work, it will be its fault.
-John Dean, former White House Counsel3
INTRODUCTION
If "justice delayed" is "justice denied,"4 justice is often denied in
American courts. Delay in the courts is a "ceaseless and unremitting prob-
lem of modem civil justice"5 that "has an irreparable effect on both plain-
tiffs and defendants."6
To combat this seemingly intractable problem, judges and court admin-
istrators routinely clamor for additional judicial resources to enable them to
manage their dockets more "effectively and efficiently."7 By building new
courthouses and adding new judgeships, a court should be able to manage
its caseload more efficiently. Trial judges should be able to hold motion
hearings, host settlement conferences, and conduct trials in a timely fash-
ion; appellate judges should be able to review briefs, hear oral arguments,
and issue opinions expeditiously; and the crippling delay that often hobbles
litigants and lawyers should give way to the speedy (or at least speedier)
resolution of disputes.
But will it?
Intuitively, it seems obvious-even mathematically so-that a court
will manage its docket more efficiently if it acquires additional judicial re-
3 John Dean, Rehnquist's Unsung Report on the Federal Judiciary: How to Make the Annual
Roundup Rhyme, Findlaw, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20020104.html (Jan. 4, 2002) (demon-
strating how Chief Justice Rehnquist could have made his 2001 Year-End Report more "appealing").
4 This quote is attributed to former British Prime Minister William Gladstone. See LAURENCE J.
PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIMES 276 (1977).
5 George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 527
(1989).
6 Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does Not Heal, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 880, 883 (2000).
7 See, e.g., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, To Serve More Litigants and Justice, the Judiciary Needs
More Judges, THIRD BRANCH, July 2003, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/july03ttb/
Serve/index.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003) (recounting hearings before the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on the Courts during which various witnesses testified that the federal judiciary required additional judge-
ships, due primarily to current caseloads); Dan Christensen, Federal Judges Make Case for Increased
Ranks, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Apr. 17, 2002, at A l (reporting that South Florida's federal judges
are seeking four new federal judgeships from the United States Judicial Council of the 11 th Circuit); Court
Asks for 32 Judgeships, FLA. BAR NEWS, Mar. 15, 1999, at 1 (reporting that the Florida Supreme Court re-
quested six new county judges, twenty-five new circuit judges, and one new court of appeals judge in its
annual certification opinion to the state legislature); Study Finds More Judges Needed, CLARION-LEDGER,
Jan. 1, 2003, at AI (reporting that the Judicial Advisory Study Committee recommended a new judgeship
for each Mississippi court district); REHNQUIST, supra note 2 (observing that, as he reflects over his seven-
teen year-end reports, he is "struck by the number of issues that seem regularly to crop up," including "the
need for additional judgeships"). To be sure, proponents of the "more courts, more judges" agenda seek
these additional resources for a variety of reasons; however, for the most part, their pleas are motivated by a
desire to improve the processing of the existing stock of cases. See generally COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998).
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sources. Imagine, for example, a court in which 1100 cases are filed per
year. Suppose in Year One that the court has ten judges who collectively
resolve 1000 cases (100 per judge), leaving a backlog of 100 cases. Now
suppose in Year Two that this court adds a courtroom and fills it with two
additional judges. Populated with twelve judges, this court should now be
able to resolve 1200 cases, eliminate its backlog, and have unused capacity
(unless, of course, the two new judges are unable to process the existing
caseload as quickly as their more experienced colleagues).
Although this account of adjudication is intuitively compelling, it
might just be wrong. This account assumes "justice supply" and "justice
demand" are unrelated-that is, it assumes an increase in the supply of ju-
dicial resources will not have any impact on the demand for justice because
litigation demand is exogenous to its supply. In fact, however, researchers
from a rather unlikely place-transportation economics-have given us rea-
son to question this "justice exogeneity assumption." Transportation
economists (along with mathematicians, population scientists, operations
researchers, and civil engineers) have demonstrated that when governments
attempt to meet traffic demand by building new roads or adding new lanes
to existing roads, traffic often increases. Called "induced traffic," the basic
idea is that an increase in the supply of roads often leads to an increase in
demand among the citizenry to drive on those roads.
This Essay relies on this "induced traffic" phenomenon to develop the
argument that an increase in the supply of courts or judges may lead to an
increase in demand for adjudication. Holding constant the various exoge-
nous factors that might lead to increased litigation-such as a spurt in the
size of the population or an expansion of legal rights and remedies due to
the enactment of a new statute-we contend that an increase in the supply
of courts or judges in and of itself can lead to an increase in the demand for
adjudication.
The positive argument we develop in this Essay raises important nor-
mative questions about the allocation of judicial resources: If adding judi-
cial resources increases the demand for litigation, what should court
reformers do? How, in other words, should court reformers respond to
Judge Reinhardt, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and others clamoring for more
courts and more judges?8 Should court reformers increase, maintain, or
even decrease society's store of judicial resources?
One's answers to these questions turn largely on one's view of litiga-
tion. One group of scholars-which we call the "public adjudication"
group--would call for more courts and more judges even if the effect were
to induce litigation. For these scholars, litigation is an underutilized public
good that should be expanded to meet latent demand among individuals
who "sit on their rights" rather than litigate. Another group of scholars-
which we call the "private ordering" group-would argue that society is al-
8 See supra notes 1-2, 7.
98:545 (2004)
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ready too litigious. For these scholars, disputes should be resolved not in-
side, but rather outside, the courtroom.
The views of the public adjudication and private ordering groups seem
irreconcilably opposed. One group wants to expand judicial resources to en-
courage more claimants to invoke the courts; the other group wants to hold
judicial resources constant to discourage claimants from doing the very same
thing. We argue, however, that society can-and should-reconcile these
seemingly irreconcilable views. We concur with the public adjudication
group that society should encourage those with viable legal claims to pursue
those claims. We concur with the private ordering group that many individu-
als will fare better if they pursue their claims through less formal and more
flexible processes than litigation. Thus, we contend that jurisdictions should
expand not only their judicial resources, but also their other dispute resolution
resources.
Even if the members of the public adjudication and private ordering
groups reject our normative conclusions, however, the positive arguments
that we develop in the Essay should still be of interest to them. To be sure,
litigation rates are largely a product of such exogenous factors as population,
economic conditions, and the like. But in this Essay, we show that changes in
judicial resources can also influence the amount of litigation in society and
can do so in counterintuitive ways. Increases in the supply of judicial re-
sources may induce more potential litigants to become actual litigants.
To develop these arguments, we proceed as follows. In Part I, we ex-
plain the concept of impure public goods, a category that captures both
roadways and courts, and then delineate the economic analysis of those
goods. Based on the salient similarities between the two goods, we argue
that theories of road traffic can inform theories of court traffic. In Part II,
we examine induced traffic theory as it has been applied to roadways, and
in Part III, we apply the induced traffic theory to litigation. Having done
so, we conclude in Part IV by laying out the normative implications.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS
Court reformers and transportation planners might seem to have little
in common; however, they confront largely the same problem and propose
essentially the same solution. The problem facing both court reformers
and transportation planners is excess demand; at any given time, too many
people want to use the courts and the roads. The solution both court re-
formers and transportation planners propose is to increase supply. By
providing more courts and roads, the traffic problems plaguing both will
dissipate.9
9 For a discussion of transportation proposals, see infra note 44. For court proposals, see supra note
7 and infra note 74.
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Implicit in this analysis is the naive assumption that an increase in
supply will not lead to an increase in demand; that is, the addition of
courts and roadways will not induce more individuals to adjudicate their
disputes or to drive on the new roadways. Economic analysis demon-
strates, however, that increases in the supply of a good generally lead to a
reduction in price and a subsequent increase in demand for that good."
When a manufacturer produces more guns or butter, for example, the
price of guns and butter drops, and the quantity demanded by consumers
rises.
We argue that courts and roadways-like guns and butter-are
"goods" susceptible to economic analysis. However, as we explain be-
low, courts and roadways are goods of a particular type-namely, they are
public goods subject to crowding or what we will call "impure public
goods."" This argument is central to our Essay because induced traffic
analysis is applicable only to goods of this type. This means that we must
establish that both courts and roadways are impure public goods in order
to develop the argument that litigation can be induced by increases in the
supply of judicial resources, just like traffic can be induced by increases
in the supply of roadways.'"
A. Demand, Supply, and Types of Goods
Classical economic models assume that individuals seek to maximize
their subjective expected utility. 3 When deciding whether to purchase
one good or another, individuals assess the costs and benefits of each
good and then select the one that promises the greatest rewards. 4 The
10 See EDGAR K. BROWNING & MARK A. ZUPAN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
21-23 (6th ed. 1999) (explaining that an increased quantity is available at each price following an
increase in supply of a good); HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN
APPROACH ch. 1 (6th ed. 2003) (setting forth the general demand and supply behavior of a market).
I We are adopting the terminology of Richard Comes and Todd Sandler. See generally
RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB
GOODS (2d ed. 1996).
12 Transportation studies generally do not examine the nature of roadways as goods. However,
public choice scholarship typically includes highways in the list of public goods, particularly when
examining public goods subject to congestion. See, e.g., id. at 273-77.
13 See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 73 (5th ed. 2001) (de-
fining the concept of "utility" as a means of assigning an objective score to the relative level of satis-
faction that a person gets from consuming a good or undertaking an activity); id at 72-75; VARIAN,
supra note 10, at 54 (laying out the economic theory of "utility" as "a way to describe [consumer]
preferences").
14 See BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 10, at 45-79 (detailing the theory of consumer choice,
under which consumers select their most preferred basket of goods given their options and budget);
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 13, at 79, 79-86 (explaining how and why consumers "maximize
the satisfaction they can achieve, given the limited budget available to them").
98:545 (2004)
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utility-maximizing decisions of the members of a society make up the de-
mand for society's goods. 5
Because utility maximization is a subjective process-that is, indi-
viduals place different values on the very same good based on their per-
sonal assessment of its costs and benefits-the demand for most goods is
"elastic" with respect to price. 6 In other words, the demand for most
goods is responsive to the price of those goods. Some individuals will
purchase a good even if its price is high; others will choose to acquire the
good only if its price is much lower; and so on. Generally, more consum-
ers will purchase a good at a lower price than will purchase that same
good at a higher price. Thus, the market demand for goods is greater
when prices are lower.
The price of a good is a product not only of the demand for it, but
also of its availability or supply.7 As the supply of a good rises, its price
tends to drop; as its supply falls, the price of the good tends to rise. Be-
cause the demand for a good is affected by its price, changes in price
caused by changes in supply will influence the demand for the good.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the relationship between
supply and demand. In period 1, the price and quantity of a good are set
at the point where demand and supply meet: price P1 and quantity Q1.
When supply increases in period 2, the supply curve shifts outward be-
cause sellers are now willing to sell a greater quantity at each price level.
Thus, the price in period 2 decreases to P2 and the quantity increases to
Q2 because more consumers wish to purchase the good at the new, lower
price.
15 See BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 10, at 96 (illustrating how "the individual demand curves
of all the consumers in the market added together constitute the market demand curve"); id. at 96-99;
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 13, at 102-10 (explaining the analytical transition from utility
theory to individual consumer demand).
16 See VARIAN, supra note 10, at 270-73, 280 (presenting a mathematical and graphical explana-
tion of price elasticity of demand).
17 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 13, at 23-24 (explaining that the "equilibrium, or
market-clearing, price and quantity" of a good is determined by the intersection of demand and sup-
ply of the good).
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Figure 1: Demand and Supply: Price and Quantity After Increased Supply
P
r
i
c Supply: Period 1e Demand
Supply: Period 2
P2 . - -
Q1 Q2 Quantity
Goods are not uniform, however. Individuals demand, among other
things, food, electronic equipment, housing, medical services, access to
public parks, use of roadways, a public dispute resolution system, and any
number of items that are quite dissimilar from one another. Economic
analysis of any good must take into account the characteristics of that good,
including whether its availability to one consumer is influenced by the con-
sumption of other consumers.
Early economic models assumed that individuals maximized utility
solely by consuming pure private goods.18 A pure private good is character-
ized by exclusive use; that is, a pure private good is one that only one per-
son can consume and that is unavailable after consumption.19 If a person
who prefers apples to oranges is offered a choice between an apple or an or-
ange, she will maximize her utility by selecting the apple rather than the or-
ange. When she has consumed it, the apple will be unavailable for anyone
else to enjoy. That apple is an example of a pure private good.
Despite the assumptions of the early economic models, individuals re-
ceive utility not only from pure private goods, but also from goods that are
shared or collective. Economists recognized this long ago, but they failed
18 It would be possible to cite nearly any work on social welfare or choice functions to demonstrate
this point, as Nobel Economist James Buchanan observed in 1965: "The implied institutional setting for
neo-classical economic theory, including theoretical welfare economics, is a rdgime of private property,
in which all goods and services are privately (individually) utilized or consumed." James M. Buchanan,
An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1, 1 (1965).
19 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 11, at 8-10; ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS
AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 106 (1980) (observing that "goods that are really private, or exclusively
used by one person, are easy to think of: a glass of beer, a set of false teeth, a pair of socks, a ham-
burger").
98:545 (2004)
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to include shared goods in the individual utility function." Paul Samuelson
was the first to delve into the nature of these shared or collective goods; he
introduced pure public goods into economic models in 1954.2" Samuelson
defined pure public goods as "collective consumption goods (XN+1 , ... , Xnn)
which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption
of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's con-
sumption of that good, so that Xn+j = X'n+j simultaneously for each and
every ith individual and each collective good."22 To put it more simply, the
quantity of a public good ("X') available for consumption by any individual
("i") is equal to the quantity available to the entire group. A pure public
good, in contrast to a pure private good, remains available for others, de-
spite any one person's use and despite any one person's efforts to prevent
others from consuming it.23
In other words, the defining features of a pure public good are "non-
rivalry of consumption"24 and the infeasibility of excluding other consum-
20 Adam Smith may have been the first to recognize the difference between private and public
goods, when he wrote of goods "which, although they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a
great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could not repay the expense to any individual
or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small
number of individuals should erect or maintain." See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES 779 (Modem Library ed. 1994) (1776).
21 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
Samuelson won the second Nobel Prize awarded in Economics (in 1970) for his large and varied body
of work or, in the words of the Committee, "for the scientific work through which he has developed
static and dynamic economic theory and actively contributed to raising the level of analysis in economic
science." Nobel E-Museum, at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1970 (last modified June 16,
2000).
22 See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 387.
23 Theoretically, public goods are similar to externalities. For example, an individual who is vacci-
nated against an infectious disease produces nonrival and nonexcludable benefits in the form of a posi-
tive externality: others gain because they are less likely to catch the disease now that one individual
cannot be a carrier. Each individual's gain has no effect on the availability of the benefit to others, and
it is not feasible to prevent any individual from benefiting. See BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 10, at
542 (presenting this example). The traditional distinction between externalities and public goods is in
the very nature of their supply: the former are the product of private actors' decisions, while the latter
require collective action. However, the underlying theory is closely related, and real world situations
reflect components of both. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 11, at 5 (discussing the relationship
between Pigouvian externalities and public goods); S.E. Holtermann, Externalities and Public Goods, 39
ECONOMICA 78, 78 (1972) (analyzing the relationship between externalities and public goods and find-
ing that "many externally produced commodities have the character of public goods"); Andrew Schotter
& Gerhard Schwodiaer, Economics and the Theory of Games: A Survey, 18 J. ECON. LIT. 479, 500-01
(1980) (arguing that the two phenomena, while distinct, both entail "the most fundamental strategic in-
terdependence among economic agents").
24 The nonrivalry characteristic may also be described as "jointness of supply." See, e.g., DENNIS
C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 11 (2003) (defining a "pure public good" as one that "has two salient
characteristics: jointness of supply and the impossibility or inefficiency of excluding others from its
consumption, once it has been supplied to some members of the community"); J.G. Head, Public Goods
and Public Policy, 17 PUB. FIN. 197 (1962). A good with extreme jointness of supply has entirely fixed
production costs; thus, the (marginal) cost of an additional unit is zero. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra, at I I
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ers.25 Non-rival consumption means that individuals are not rivals for the
good-consumption by one person does not diminish the quantity and qual-
ity of the good available to others.26 A classic example is national defense.
One person's consumption of national defense-by enjoying the protection
afforded by the armed forces-does not detract from another person's con-
sumption of the same good. National defense also demonstrates the second
salient characteristic of a public good: it is not possible to prevent one
member of a community from enjoying the protection afforded by the de-
fense of the community as a whole." Because producers of pure public
goods cannot exclude members of a society from consuming that good,
markets typically fail to provide public goods, and thus the state exists, in
part, to do so."
(explaining how "U]ointness of supply is a property of the production or cost function of the public
good"); Edna Loehman & Andrew Whinston, A New Theory of Pricing and Decision-Making for Public
Investment, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. Sc1. 606, 607 (1971) (defining jointness of supply for a
"Samuelson public good" to mean that "once a service is provided to one user at some level, another
user can be serviced at the same level for zero extra cost"). For example, the signals of a lighthouse may
be consumed by additional ships at no additional cost. All the costs of providing the signal are fixed-
unrelated to the number of ships that are able to avoid the shoals due to the light. See also CORNES &
SANDLER, supra note 11, at 8 (referring to nonrivalry as "indivisibility of benefits" and stating that a
"good is nonrival or indivisible when a unit of the good can be consumed by one individual without de-
tracting, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available to others from that same unit.
Sunsets are nonrival or indivisible when views are unobstructed.").
25 See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 11, at 8-9 (explaining that a good with excludable
benefits is one "whose benefits can be withheld costlessly by the owner or provider;" by contrast a good
with nonexcludable benefits is "available to all once the good is provided," such as "[fqirework displays,
strategic weapons, pollution-control devices, and street lighting"); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note
13, at 645 (observing that "it is difficult or impossible to charge people for using nonexclusive goods;
the goods can be enjoyed without direct payment").
26 BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 10, at 535 (explaining that "nonrival consumption means poten-
tial simultaneous consumption of a good by many persons").
27 A pure public good possesses both of these characteristics, but it is possible for a good to have
one characteristic but not the other. Consider a television broadcast. The consumption by one person
of a television broadcast does not affect the availability of the broadcast for others. However, the
broadcaster, by using technological devices, may exclude (at least some) persons from receiving the
broadcast without paying. Thus, the television broadcast is nonrival, but exclusive. Likewise, the
government may exclude the direct use of public parks by charging entry fees and of roads by charg-
ing tolls. Other goods may be rival, but nonexclusive. For example, the air is freely available for
everyone to "consume," but some forms of consumption-such as the emission of pollutants-
adversely affect the use of others who seek to breathe the air. See id. at 536; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 13, at 645.
28 See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 24, at 25 (explaining that "[plublic goods are a classic example of
market failures economists cite as justification for government intervention"); id. at 9-25; James Su-
rowiecki, Leave No Parent Behind, NEW YORKER, Aug. 18 & 25, 2003, at 48. Surowiecki argues that
"children are ... a 'public good' in that everyone benefits from children because "we all gain from
having more people going to college and becoming productive workers," even if we do not all pay for
them (because some people don't have children). Id. Consistent with his argument, government should
subsidize-or redistribute-the cost of children to ensure that the optimal level of children is raised.
Even Adam Smith, the champion of markets, concluded that governments must be charged with "erect-
ing or maintaining those public institutions and those public works" that constitute public goods.
98:545 (2004)
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Pure public goods are uncommon, however, because "few, if any,
goods satisfy the conditions of extreme collectiveness" required by Samuel-
son's definition.29 Most goods that might appear to be pure public goods
are not because the use of the good by one consumer decreases the use or
enjoyment available to other consumers, typically due to crowding." As
James Buchanan explains, the "utility that an individual receives from [a
public good's] consumption depends upon the number of other persons with
whom he must share its benefits."'"
Consider, for example, a public monument like the Vietnam War Me-
morial or the Washington Monument. At first glance, it seems that a public
monument is a pure public good akin to national defense because one per-
son's viewing of it does not deprive any other person of enjoying it as well.
Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that a public monument
is not a pure public good because the use by some individuals may prevent
others from enjoying it due to long lines, difficulties finding parking, a lim-
ited number of tour guides, and so on. In short, as Buchanan (writing
largely about so-called "club goods"32) and Mancur Olson (writing largely
about the limits of collective action33) subsequently observed, pure public
SMITH, supra note 20, at 779. Economists have debated whether Smith imagined this list to be particu-
larly lengthy and/or whether he expected that publicly traded corporations, rather than governments,
would be able to provide many of these public goods. See generally E.G. West, Adam Smith's Public
Economics: A Re-Evaluation, 10 CAN. J. EcON. 1 (1977).
29 See Buchanan, supra note 18, at 1. Samuelson recognized the narrow scope of pure public goods,
as he made clear in a subsequent note published the following year. Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic
Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350, 356 (1955) (arguing that
"[t]o deny that most public functions fit into my extreme definition of a public good is not to grant that
they satisfy the logically equally-extreme category of a private good").
30 See, e.g., Stephen Enke, More on the Misuse of Mathematics in Economics: A Rejoinder, 37
REV. ECON. & STAT. 131, 132-33 (1955) (arguing that "Samuelson's collective consumption goods
comprise a small class at the opposite extreme from his more numerous private consumption goods" be-
cause "for a given public expenditure, I can have better service or more consumption enjoyment if other
people will not exercise their rights to these benefits or compete with me for their favorable deploy-
ment"); Julius Margolis, A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT.
347, 347-48 (1955) (observing that the consumption of most public services is diminished by "capacity
limitations and congestion").
31 Buchanan, supra note 18, at 3.
32 Id. at 1. A Buchanan club good is a collective good enjoyed by a private, voluntary association
with access only to its members. The classic example of a club good is a country club, which makes its
golf course and swimming pool available to a group of members. Goods provided by the government
may similarly be limited-for example, a city's public library may be available only to citizens who live
within the city's boundaries. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (reasoning that "[t]he consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that com-
munity which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods"); MUELLER, supra note 24, at 182-
89 (arguing that both Buchanan and Tiebout solve the problems of self-rule "by the surprisingly simple
device of allowing people to sort themselves out into groups of like tastes"); Todd Sandler & John T.
Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 18 J. ECON. LIT. 1481, 1506-08
(1980) (comparing and contrasting the Tiebout community with the Buchanan club).
33 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965). See also TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 23-27
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goods are quite rare. Most ostensibly "pure" public goods are, in fact, "im-
pure public goods" or public goods whose use or enjoyment is diminished
by crowding.
All goods can be arrayed along a spectrum, ranging from "pure private
goods" at one end to "pure public goods" at the other.34 As depicted in Fig-
ure 2, below, impure public goods, like national monuments, fall between
these two extremes, but share more in common with pure public goods than
with pure private goods.35
Figure 2: Types of Goods
Pure Impure Pure
Private Public Public
B. Courts and Roadways as Impure Public Goods
Courts and roadways might appear to be pure public goods because
each has an aspect (or output) that is enjoyed by the whole community
equally. The highway system appears to be a pure public good in that the
availability of roadways allows for the economic growth and development
of a city, state, and nation. Likewise, the justice system appears to be a
pure public good because the courts resolve disputes peacefully and articu-
late legal rules that enable people to order their lives. Those benefits (or
output) are nonexcludable and nonrival 6
Both courts and roadways, however, have aspects (or outputs) that are
not purely public. The individualized use of either good (i.e., the resolution
of one person's complaint or one commuter's use of the road) is inherently
divisible and rival, as one person's presence precludes others from using the
(1992) (presenting a formal model of Olson's theory regarding group provision of collective goods);
Gary J. Miller, The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 1173,
1177-81 (1997) (evaluating the influence of Olson's work on the development of public choice scholar-
ship in political science, including the concept of public goods).
34 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 11, at 8-9 (clarifying that there is probably not a unidimen-
sional space that accommodates the various types of goods that exist between the extremes because they
differ along more than one dimension).
35 We choose the admittedly broader term "impure public goods," rather than the term "club good,"
to describe government-provided goods to avoid confusion with Buchanan clubs.
36 Cf Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 102, 114-19
(1986); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 235-37, 240 (1978) (arguing that state-sponsored adjudication provides a public good-the enun-
ciation of rules and precedent-that cannot be provided efficiently or effectively by private adjudicators
such as arbitrators); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2622-26 (1995) (describing the nonexcludable benefits of trials).
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same part of the good during that period.37 The larger the number of per-
sons using courts or roads, the greater the effect on the use by others due to
congestion and crowding.38 Thus, the judicial and highways systems are
more appropriately categorized as impure public goods,39 comprised of both
pure and impure aspects.4"
Economists sometimes refer to impure public goods, like courts and
highways, as "club goods" because congestion creates rivalry among users
and may give rise to attempts to exclude some participants, thereby forming
a "club."41 However, Buchanan developed the concept of a club good to re-
fer to a collective good enjoyed by a private, voluntary association (not a
government) that allows access only to its members, such as a golf or tennis
club.42 Governments may also limit access to, or use of, impure public
goods-for example, the National Park Service may limit the number of
cars admitted each day to a park or charge a fee to deter some prospective
visitors"3-but the available mechanisms of exclusion are much weaker than
37 Cf Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 235-37 (examining the dispute resolution service of
courts as a private good in a market that includes arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution ser-
vices ("ADR")).
38 See, e.g., Holtermann, supra note 23, at 81 (explaining that "the total provision of judicial ser-
vices enters equally into everybody's consumption vector as a public good; but the utilization of the ser-
vices will be different for different individuals, and an increase in one person's utilization of the
facilities decreases the amount available to other people"); Samuelson, supra note 21, at 356 (recogniz-
ing that courts and highway programs cannot be put into a "rigid category" of "polar" public goods be-
cause there is "an element of variability in the benefit that can go to one citizen at the expense of some
other citizens").
39 Economists also refer to goods that have pure and impure public good characteristics as "mixed"
public goods or "joint" goods. See, e.g., Holtermann, supra note 23, at 81-83 (describing goods like
roads and courts as "mixed cases which Samuelson has suggested can be analysed fruitfully in terms of
some kind of a blend of the models of pure public goods and pure private goods"); CORNES & SANDLER,
supra note 11, at 9, 542-43 (describing such hybrid goods as "joint product" goods).
40 The hybrid nature of both goods can be seen by considering their production and consumption
functions. Like a pure public good, many judicial and road system costs are fixed (building the system,
running it, creating rules to govern it), therefore the average cost of the good (the cost of production di-
vided by the quantity consumed) decreases with each additional user. But, adjudication and transporta-
tion are not pure public goods because each has a positive marginal cost: an additional user increases
the price of the good by increasing congestion and producing delays. The consumer does not incur the
entire marginal cost of her use-that cost is also borne by other users of the system. But, "[e]ven a good
with falling average costs, although positive marginal costs, has elements ofjointess that raise collec-
tive provision issues." MUELLER, supra note 24, at 11.
41 See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 33, at 64 ("Club goods include highways, cities, infrastructure,
military arsenals, terrorist commando squads, police forces, zoos, museums, golf courses, universities,
learned societies, movie theaters, parks, recreation facilities, straits, canals, trauma clinics, and librar-
ies."). Sandler, a political economist, considers any "excludable public good" to be a club good. Id. at
63 (defining a club broadly to include any "voluntary collective that derives mutual benefits from shar-
ing one or more of the following: production costs, the members' characteristics, or an impure public
good characterized by excludable benefits").
42 See generally Buchanan, supra note 18.
43 See Tiebout, supra note 32.
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those available to private clubs. Thus, courts and roads are more accurately
characterized as "impure public goods" rather than "club goods."
Inherent in any impure public good-whether a court or a roadway or
some other item-is congestion or crowding. Both legal scholars and trans-
portation economists are acutely aware of this phenomenon, but only trans-
portation economists have actually attempted to model and measure it. In
the next Part, we present the induced traffic model they have applied to
roadways, and in the following Part, we use their insights to develop our
own model of induced traffic in the courts.
II. INDUCED TRAFFIC
Transportation economists have applied the conventional tools of eco-
nomic analysis to roadways and roadway congestion. This might seem odd.
Because roadways are impure public goods rather than pure private goods,
it appears as though they might be immune to market forces. After all, the
state generally provides access to roadways free of charge, so an increase in
the supply of roadways will not lead to an increase in demand because the
price of driving remains the same. By increasing the supply of roads, the
state should be able to meet excess demand and relieve congestion.
In fact, however, the laws of supply and demand do apply to impure
public goods like roadways, despite the fact that policymakers often ignore
such laws.' The reason policymakers sometimes misunderstand this is be-
cause they adopt an unrealistically narrow view of the "price" of driving.
They assume that the only relevant price is what we might call the explicit
price a consumer has to pay out of pocket. Because roadways are generally
available free of charge, drivers do not pay an explicit price to use them.
When they think of price in this way, policymakers ignore what we might
call the implicit price of driving; yet, it is also relevant. Drivers pay an im-
plicit price in the form of opportunity costs. 5 Driving, in short, takes time,
and the implicit price of driving is higher when the roads are congested than
when they are not. Because drivers are likely to respond not only to
changes in explicit prices, but also to changes in implicit prices, changes in
roadway supply are likely to influence driver demand. When the state adds
a lane to a congested roadway, for example, the implicit price of driving on
that roadway drops. This drop in implicit price then leads more drivers to
travel on the roadway, causing the implicit price of driving to rise again as
44 See, e.g., Mark Hansen, The Traffic Inducement Effect: Its Meaning and Measurement, 481
TRANSP. RES. CIRCULAR 7, 7-8 (1998) (criticizing United States road construction advocates for assum-
ing a fixed quantity of traffic and ignoring the relationship between supply and demand of transporta-
tion); Peter J. Mackie, Induced Traffic and Economic Appraisal, 23 TRANSP. 103 (1996) (observing that
the United Kingdom's Department of Transportation has used a fixed-demand or fixed-trip assumption
in its models, which is a vast simplification of a reality that is subject to the law of demand).
45 But see Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (proposing that consumers weight out-of-pocket costs more heavily than opportunity
costs).
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travel times return to, and often surpass, pre-expansion levels. This phe-
nomenon-induced traffic-"is one of the most troubling [issues] facing
transportation planning today."46  Transportation economists and other
scholars have invested considerable resources in developing a theory to ex-
plain induced traffic and in devising empirical methods to measure it.
A. Induced Traffic Theory
Transportation economists assume that drivers are rational actors who
make narrowly self-interested decisions when contemplating travel. When
attempting to assess the option that will maximize their utility, drivers con-
sider several factors:
* whether to travel at all (or "trip generation")?
* to which destination (or "trip distribution")?
* at what time (or "trip scheduling")?
* by what mode of transportation (or "modal choice")?
" by what route (or "traffic assignment")?
* whether to travel solo or with others (or "vehicle occupancy")?
• how often to make the trip (or "trip frequency")?47
After considering each of these factors, drivers make the travel decision that
is most likely to satisfy their narrow self-interest (and ignore the impact of
their decision on others.)48
When a state expands its roadways, drivers are likely to take that into
account when making travel decisions in both the short term and the long
term. In the short term, a driver might take new trips (e.g., a driver might
visit a distant store because the cost of travel has decreased); travel the
same route more frequently (e.g., a worker might drive home for lunch
46 Transp. Research Bd., Introduction to Special Issue: Highway Capacity Expansion and Induced
Travel: Evidence and Implications, 481 TRANSP. RES. CIRCULAR 5, 5 (1998).
47 See Peter J. Hills, What is Induced Traffic, 23 TRANSP. 5, 8 (1996); see also Richard G. Dowling
& Steven B. Colman, Effects of Increased Highway Capacity: Results of Household Travel Behavior
Survey, 1493 TRANSP. RES. REC. 143, 144-45 (1995); TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, EXPANDING METROPOLITAN HIGHWAYS: IMPLICATIONS FOR AIR QUALITY AND ENERGY USE
144-45 (Special Rpt. No. 245, 1995).
48 These assumptions are not uncontroversial. Legal scholars, behavioral economists, and cognitive
psychologists have produced a wealth of empirical evidence demonstrating that individuals are not the
purely rational and narrowly self-interested creatures envisioned by economic models. See, e.g., Chris-
tine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998) (arguing
that, on the basis of empirical evidence from cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, individu-
als are boundedly rational, boundedly self-interested, and possess bounded willpower); Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000) (arguing similarly that individuals are constrained
from maximizing self-interest due to limited reasoning abilities, concern for others, and features of the
decision context).
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rather than eating at her desk); travel at different times (e.g., a worker might
commute during rush hour because travel should now be easier at that
time); or travel alone (e.g., a commuter might choose not to carpool because
the carpool lanes no longer offer the same comparative advantage over the
regular lanes). All of these short-term adjustments reflect increases in the
quantity of travel demanded, which result from an effective decline in the
price of driving in the form of faster roads.49
In the longer term, drivers will make more substantial adaptations in
response to the lower price of driving. For example, a driver might accept a
job that is a greater distance from her home and/or only accessible by car,
move to a suburb farther from work or school, or increase her capital in-
vestment in an automobile because she is using it more frequently. More-
over, third parties will also respond to the longer-term adaptations of
drivers. For example, business offices might move out of the city center to
take advantage of lower rents, retail stores might move to auto-dependent
shopping centers, and companies might establish new locations in areas that
were formerly inaccessible. These longer-term changes in response to ex-
panded highways will produce a change in the underlying demand for vehi-
cle travel: That is, the quantity demanded at every given price will
increase. 0 Thus, in the longer term, new roads lead to increased demand
that may result in greater congestion than existed prior to expansion.
A German operations researcher named Dietrich Braess presented an
idea in 1968 that would give rise to induced traffic theory. He demon-
strated formally that the introduction of an additional road to a congested
network of roads may lead to longer travel times for all users without the
addition of new users." A.D. Irvine offers the following explanation:
Despite the fact that each driver seeks to minimize his or her travel time across
a system of roadways, it turns out that within congested systems the addition
of extra routes will sometimes decrease (rather than increase) the overall effi-
ciency of the system. The result is surprising since in uncongested systems the
addition of new routes can only lower, or at worst not change, the travel time
of each driver at equilibrium. In contrast, Braess' paradox shows that within
49 See Robert B. Noland, Relationships Between Highway Capacity and Induced Vehicle Travel, 35
TRANSP. REs.-A 47,49 (2001).
The underlying theory behind induced travel is based upon the simple economic theory of supply
and demand. Any increase in highway capacity (supply) results in a reduction in the time cost of
travel. Travel time is the major component of variable costs experienced by those using private
vehicles for travel. When any good (in this case travel) is reduced in cost, demand for that good
increases.
Id.
50 See generally Lewis M. Fulton et al., A Statistical Analysis of Induced Travel Effects in the U.S.
Mid-Atlantic Region, J. TRANS. & STAT., Apr. 2000, at 1, 2-3; Noland, supra note 49, at 51.
51 Dietrich Braess, Uber ein Paradoxen der Verkehrsplanung, 12 UNTERNEHMENSFORSCHUNG 258
(1968); see also J.D. Murchland, Braess's Paradox of Traffic Flow, 4 TRANSP. RES. 391 (1970) (offer-
ing a brief review in English of Braess's paper, which was published in German).
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congested systems, the addition of new routes can result in increased mean
travel time for all drivers.52
While each driver is trying to find a path that minimizes her individual
travel time, the concerted efforts of all drivers lead to too many individuals
using the new road. In short, Braess's Paradox predicts that the introduc-
tion of a new route to a congested network may exacerbate rather than re-
lieve crowding. 3
Induced traffic theory builds on the recognition that the use of road-
ways is characterized by a nonoptimal equilibrium and thus requires a coor-
dination mechanism to maximize social welfare. 4 The market fails to
provide this mechanism: Drivers do not pay the total cost of their use of the
roads, and thus, they determine their individual use in a way that results in
total public use exceeding the optimal social level.5 That is, the social cost
of driving on the roadways (the cost to all users from an additional user-
i.e., congestion) exceeds the social benefit (the gain to all users from an ad-
ditional user-i.e., the societal or economic value of the added trip). The
market failure results from individuals maximizing their payoffs given their
private costs and gains in a setting in which they do not pay the true mar-
ginal cost of their increased activity. 6 Thus, the utility-maximizing behav-
ior of each individual driver decreases the total gains from the collective
good. 7
52 A.D. Irvine, How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem, 7 INT'L STUD. PHIL. SCl. 141,
144 (1993).
53 See generally Richard Steinberg & Richard E. Stone, The Prevalence of Paradoxes in Transpor-
tation Equilibrium Problems, 22 TRANSP. SCI. 231, 233-34 (1988) (providing a mathematical explana-
tion of Braess's argument).
54 Interestingly, the production, as opposed to consumption, of impure public goods also requires a
non-market coordination mechanism to obtain optimal output (from a social welfare perspective). But,
on the production side, the problem is one of underproduction due to the difficulty of excluding users;
on the consumption side, the problem is one of over-consumption.
55 See G. Alperovich, An Economic Interpretation ofBraess' Paradox, 24 INT'L J. TRANSP. ECON.
145 (1997).
56 See Thomas Bass, Road to Ruin, DISCOVER, May 1992, at 56, 61 (recounting Rockefeller Univer-
sity Professor Joel Cohen's observation that Braess revealed the circumstances under which "everyone
[is] worse off if they pursued their own self-interest" rather than considering the impact of their behavior
on others).
57 Various proposals have been set forth to tax drivers for using roads as one way to force intemali-
zation of marginal costs. See, e.g., Jonathan Marshall, How to Break Up Traffic Jams, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 15, 1986, § 1, at 32 (describing successful electronic toll programs in Singapore and Hong Kong
and advocating their application in the United States). On February 17, 2003, London's mayor intro-
duced a controversial "congestion charge" for auto travel within the city center. See Special Report:
Congestion Charging, Guardian, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/congestion/0,12768,868135,00.html (up-
dated daily) (offering a complete guide to every aspect of congestion charging, including how to pay the
charge, where it applies, treatment of violators, and so on); see also Eric I. Pas & Shari L. Principio,
Braess' Paradox: Some New Insights, 31 TRANSP. RES.-B 265, 273-75 (1997) (testing the parameters
under which marginal cost pricing counteracts the induced travel effect).
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B. Empirical Evidence of Induced Traffic
Demonstrating that additional roadways lead to increases in traffic is
not easy because it is challenging to control for exogenous factors that
might also increase traffic. 8 Most transportation researchers acknowledge
that it is extremely hard to distinguish the induced travel effect from other
factors such as population and demographic changes. Nevertheless, they
have attempted to do so, employing three research methods in an attempt to
differentiate an induced traffic effect from other influences on travel: case
studies, area-wide studies, and behavioral surveys. 9
Researchers conducting before-and-after case studies measure the level
of travel and travel times on a specific roadway in periods immediately
prior to and after construction.6 ° Summarizing these case studies, David
Levinson and Seshasai Kanchi report that researchers generally have found
that a one percent increase in road capacity produces a one-half to one per-
cent increase in vehicle miles traveled in the long term.6' That is, over time,
new traffic, rather than the backlog of existing traffic, may consume any-
where from 50 to 100 percent of the additional road capacity. For example,
researchers found that an increase in high-occupancy vehicle lanes in sev-
eral California communities resulted in an increase in vehicle miles trav-
eled, although travel times remained lower.6" Mark Hansen, a University of
California-Berkeley researcher, reported that additional lanes in eighteen
different California locations resulted in increases in segment traffic, but
58 See Fulton et al., supra note 50, at 2 (reporting that "[w]hether and to what extent addition of
roadway capacity induces additional travel has been a cause of controversy in recent years and is con-
founded by the fact that other exogenous factors such as increases in population and demographic
changes have also driven [vehicle miles traveled] growth"); Phil B. Goodwin, Empirical Evidence on
Induced Traffic: A Review and Synthesis, 23 TRANSP. 35, 36-37 (1996) (reviewing competing analyses
of available evidence on induced traffic). Not surprisingly, the arguments have spread to policy debates
between those favoring construction (typically business interests) and those opposed (frequently envi-
ronmental groups). Compare WENDELL COX, SPEEDING UP THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC MAKES OUR LIVES
MORE REWARDING AND OUR ECONOMY MORE EFFICIENT (The Heartland Institute Working Paper, June
1, 2001), http://www.heartland.org./article.cfm?artld=1072, with Sierra Club, Stop Sprawl-Induced
Traffic Confirmed, at http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/transportation/seven.asp (last visited Feb. 10,
2003).
59 See generally Harry Cohen, Appendix B: Review of Empirical Studies of Induced Traffic, in
TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 47, at 295 (1995); Denvil Coombe, Induced Traffic: What Do
Transportation Models Tell Us?, 23 TRANSP. 83 (1996) (evaluating multivariate transportation models
testing the relative import of various factors in increased traffic).
60 For a description of several case studies and an appraisal of their methodology, see TRANSP.
RESEARCH BD., supra note 47, at 152-55.
61 See DAVID LEVINSON & SESHASAI KANCHI, WHENCE INDUCED DEMAND: How ACCESS
AFFECTS ACTIVITY 2 (California PATH Working Paper UCB-ITS-PWP-2000-21, Oct. 2000) (on file
with authors) (observing that economists have found price elasticity of demand for highway capacity to
range from -0.5 to -1.0).
62 See generally Robert A. Johnston & Raju Ceerla, The Effects of New High-Occupancy Vehicle
Lanes on Travel and Emissions, 30 TRANS. REs.-A 35 (1996).
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congestion (measured by the ratio of vehicles to lane miles) decreased.63 In
a study of aggregated data from all fifty states, Robert Noland found that an
increase in vehicle lanes produces an increase in travel, holding all other
factors constant.64
Researchers who conduct area-wide studies look at an entire transpor-
tation network, typically a metropolitan area, rather than a particular road-
way.65 The advantage of this approach is that it allows for consideration of
route change effects and long-term shifts in land usage in response to the
construction of roads. Generally, researchers find even greater responsive-
ness of demand to supply in area-wide studies than in case studies.66
Researchers also use commuter surveys to assess induced travel. Re-
searchers interview commuters at several points in time: prior to the con-
struction of a new road or lane, immediately following construction, and
then at a later point in time when the effects of expansion have "settled"
(typically two to three years).67 Surveys have been the least effective means
of discerning the relationship between road supply and demand, in part be-
cause the requirements for survey size and scope have been somewhat
daunting.6 Few survey results have been published.
While these empirical studies have some persuasive force, all are lim-
ited by their methods and data. It is simply quite difficult to distinguish
changes in travel due to road construction from changes due to the very
same factors that prompted the road construction in the first place. Given
63 See Hansen, supra note 44, at 9-11; see also Mark Hansen & Yuanlin Huang, Road Supply and
Traffic in California Urban Areas, 31 TRANS. REs.-A 205 (1997) (using panel data to demonstrate in-
fluence of new lane miles on vehicle miles traveled).
64 See Noland, supra note 49, at 56-67 (using a fixed effects cross-sectional time series model); see
also Fulton et al., supra note 50, at 13.
The results presented indicate a significant relationship between the level of highway capacity, as
measured by lane-miles, and the level of travel, measured by daily VMT, in the Mid-Atlantic re-
gion of the United States. After accounting for other important determinants of travel and for po-
tential simultaneity bias, the estimated elasticity between VMT and lane-miles is estimated at 0.2
to 0.6. This implies that a 10% increase in lane-mileage can result in anywhere from a 2 to 6% in-
crease in total VMT.
Id.
65 See, e.g., TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 47, at 155-57 (evaluating the area-wide methodol-
ogy).
66 Research appears to indicate that price elasticity of travel demand is greater as a study's focus
expands: moving from 0.3-0.4 for individual highway segments to 0.6 at the county level to 0.9 at the
metropolitan level. See Hansen, supra note 44, at 11-13; see also Fulton et al., supra note 50, at 8 (re-
porting, in a study of Maryland, D.C., Virginia, and North Carolina, that "after controlling for popula-
tion and income, a 10% increase in lane-miles correlates with a 3 to 6% increase in daily VMT in the
Mid-Atlantic region). By considering a larger geographic region, area-wide studies also may reveal
greater social benefits despite the increased travel times because they consider broader economic
changes.
67 See, e.g., Dowling & Colman, supra note 47, at 145-47 (describing methodology of their survey
of 700 urban Californians and reporting a small but significant increase in reported trip generation due to
highway improvement).
68 Peter Bonsall, Can Induced Traffic Be Measured by Surveys?, 23 TRANSP. 17 (1996).
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the murky results of the empirical tests of induced traffic, some experts
question the significance of the phenomenon. 69 However, even those skep-
tical of the empirical results acknowledge induced traffic must be taken into
account in transportation planning."
Scholars in other fields have also incorporated the theory into their re-
search, despite the challenges of empirical proof. Researchers have drawn
upon induced traffic theory to understand induced demand for a wide range
of impure public goods (or club goods), including medical services, tele-
communications, and computer networks.7' To our knowledge, however,
no one has done so in law.72
III. INDUCED LITIGATION
Congestion is a problem not only on the nation's roadways, but also in
the nation's courts. Court reformers, like transportation planners, often
contend the perfect decongestant is an increase in supply. By increasing the
number of courts and judges, the court reformers argue that the judicial sys-
tem will be able to accommodate existing demand without stimulating new
69 See, e.g., id.
70 See, e.g., Kevin Heanue, Highway Capacity and Induced Travel: Issues, Evidence and Implica-
tions, 481 TRANSP. RES. CIRCULAR 33, 44 (1998) (concluding that "[t]he major determinants of travel
demand are clearly socio-economic in nature. However, the inducement of travel due to any transporta-
tion system change is an issue that needs to be and can be addressed by considering behavioral and land
use change mechanisms.").
71 See, e.g., Bass, supra note 56, at 56 (detailing the work of mathematical biologist Joel Cohen who
has applied Braess's Paradox to an amazing array of settings: "Everywhere he looks, Cohen discovers
new examples of networks where added capacity can make things worse than before"); Nobuyuki Izu-
mida et al., An Empirical Study of the Physician-Induced Demand Hypothesis, 8 REV. POPULATION &
SOC. POL'Y 11 (1999) (considering the effects of an increase in the number of physicians on the demand
for medical care); Frank P. Kelly, Network Routing, 337 PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL Soc'Y 343 (1991) (utiliz-
ing Braess's Paradox to understand congestion on computer and telecommunication networks), avail-
able at http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/-frank/CP/CPREAD/nr.html; James Surowiecki, Fast Times at
Nasdaq High, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2001, at 29 (using induced traffic theory to understand why "add-
ing capacity [to the Nasdaq data center] seems to encourage traders to take advantage of it" such that
"[e]very year, Nasdaq adds more and more capacity ... [a]nd every year the traders trade more than
Nasdaq anticipated"); see also Joel E. Cohen & Frank P. Kelly, A Paradox of Congestion in a Queuing
Network, 27 J. APPLIED PROBABILITY 730 (delineating a general model of queuing networks derived
from Braess's Paradox and applicable to any system marked by waiting times due to crowding).
72 Legal scholars have recognized that adding more judges and/or decreasing delay may lead to an
increase in litigation that may surpass any initial demand. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.12 (5th ed. 1998) (explaining how queuing costs may decrease the demand for
litigation and thus delay has benefits as well as costs); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 445-48 (1973) (explaining how
delay results in a discount in the present value of litigation outcomes and thus increases the probability
of settlement); Priest, supra note 5, at 539-57 (arguing that court backlogs reflect an equilibrium of de-
lay and any changes will only have a short-term effect on disposition times); see also Kevin M. Cler-
mont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 129-32 (2002) (reviewing
Posner's evaluation of the discounting effect of delay and Priest's equilibrium delay argument).
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demand.73 In fact, however, the addition of judicial resources may induce
new demand. Relying on induced traffic theory, we develop a model of in-
duced litigation below. To do so, we first explore litigation demand and
supply and then propose our model.
A. Litigation Demand
Many court administration studies conclude that an increase in judicial
resources will have one consequence-it will reduce delays for existing liti-
gants-and one non-consequence-it will not induce others to litigate. These
studies rest on the dubious assumption that demand is "inelastic" or insensi-
tive to changes in the implicit price that litigants must pay in terms of waiting
time to litigate a case to resolution. 4 These court reformers assume, in short,
that litigants are equally willing to litigate their cases whether the expected
duration of litigation is three years or three months. To demonstrate why this
assumption is problematic, consider the demand curve for adjudication de-
picted in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Effects of Elasticity of Demand: Before and After Court Expansion
p Inelastic
r demand
SSupply before
c Elastic iexpansion
demand
SupplYiafter
P1 .............
Q1&2 Q2' Quantity
73 See supra note 7.
74 See, e.g., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 7, at 1 (describing most recent U.S. Judi-
cial Conference request for fifty-seven additional judgeships to address growing caseloads). In his ex-
amination of alternative dispute resolution systems, Frank Sander recognized that an improvement or
expansion of such systems might lead to an increase in disputes:
It is important to realize, however, that by establishing new dispute resolution mechanisms, or im-
proving existing ones, we may be encouraging the ventilation of grievances that are now being
suppressed. Whether that will be good (in terms of supplying a constructive outlet for suppressed
anger and frustration) or whether it will simply waste scarce societal resources (by validating
grievances that might otherwise have remained dormant) we do not know. The important thing to
note is that there is a clear trade-off: the price of an improved scheme of dispute processing may
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The demand curve depicts the relationship between the desire of indi-
viduals to litigate and the price of litigation (i.e., the time required for reso-
lution of a dispute).75 Thus, the demand curve shows the quantity of justice
demanded at each level of waiting time. The demand curve, by definition,
provides information with respect to a particular period of time; that is, all
other factors that affect demand are held constant so that we can isolate the
relationship between price and quantity demanded. If the quantity de-
manded is unresponsive to the price of litigation, then the demand curve is a
vertical line because the quantity demanded is constant regardless of price;
that is, demand is completely "inelastic" with respect to price.76 Figure 3
presents such an inelastic litigation demand curve.77
In Figure 3, the level of litigation prior to court expansion is Q1 and
the waiting-time price of litigation is P1. If demand is inelastic, increased
judicial capacity-reflected in an outward shift of the supply curve-results
in a much lower price of litigation (P2), while the quantity of litigation re-
mains the same (QI=Q2). If litigation demand is completely unresponsive
to changes in the price of litigation, then additional judges and courts will
have no effect on the quantity of adjudication demanded. This means that
new judges will relieve caseload backlogs in direct proportion to their addi-
tional numbers, as many court reform proposals assume.
However, litigation demand is highly unlikely to be inelastic. That is,
the inelastic demand curve in Figure 3 is highly unlikely to reflect demand
accurately. Potential litigants, at least those represented by counsel, are
likely to consider the ability of courts to offer swift and effective resolution
when deciding whether to use the judicial system.7" Thus, we expect the
demand for litigation to increase as the price of litigation decreases, holding
all other factors constant.79 (The ceteris paribus assumption allows us to
well be a vast increase in the number of disputes being processed.
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 113-14 (1976).
75 We could treat price as including other factors related to crowding, including lower quality deci-
sion making by overworked judges.
76 The price elasticity of demand measures the relationship between quantity demanded and price.
In terms of the demand curve, elasticity is the slope-the ratio of percentage change in the quantity de-
manded to the percentage change in the price, holding all other factors constant. The larger the ratio,
then the more responsive demand is to price. For example, an elasticity or slope of -5 means that a 10
percent increase in price results in a 50 percent decrease in quantity demanded. If elasticity is zero, then
the quantity demanded does not change when price changes. A curve with zero elasticity is called ine-
lastic. See generally BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 10, at 32-35; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note
13, at 30-31, 117, 165.
77 We assume at present that supply is sensitive to price.
78 This "model" assumes complete information; as a practical matter, however, it seems unlikely
that any plaintiffs will know much about waiting times applicable to their cases, hence the important in-
clusion of plaintiffs' lawyers as sources of knowledge. This basic set of insights also can help us under-
stand the reluctance to sue big, deep-pocket defendants who can unilaterally impose delays on a plaintiff
in litigation and thereby increase the price as well.
79 Cf Priest, supra note 5, at 542-43 (finding that for marginal litigants the suit-to-trial delay influ-
enced the decision to settle rather than go to trial).
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focus on the independent effect of price on litigation.) In other words, the
demand for litigation is likely to be elastic with respect to price (i.e., the
quantity demanded responds to the price level as reflected in the elastic de-
mand curve in Figure 3).8" The relationship is negative because a lower
price leads to a higher quantity demanded, and the demand curve for litiga-
tion slopes downward (i.e., a negative slope)."1 If price of litigation in-
creases due to longer delays in the system, then the number of lawsuits filed
falls. This reflects the basic law of demand.82 If litigation demand is elas-
tic, the price of litigation falls to P2' after court expansion rather than to the
lower price of P2, and the quantity of litigation increases to Q2'. Thus, a
change in the price of litigation will result, in the short term, in a change in
the quantity demanded (a move along the demand curve).
Figure 4: Shift in Demand One Period After Court Expansion
P Demand I Period
r after expansion
i Supply before
c3 expansione Demand
J 7 Supply afier
P3 ............................................... .................................................... ex pa n sio n
P2
Q1 02 03 Quantity
In the long term, expansion of court capacity will have a more substan-
tial effect: Litigants will fundamentally alter their demand to reflect the
relatively lower cost of litigation, producing an outward shift in the demand
curve as reflected in Figure 4. This fundamental revision reflects a change
80 BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 10, at 32-35; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 13, at 30-31.
81 If the price elasticity of demand is greater than one, then a one percentage point increase in price
leads to a greater than one percentage point decrease in quantity demanded and total expenditures will
fall. If the price elasticity of demand is less than one, then a one percentage point increase in price re-
sults in a less than one percentage point decrease in quantity and total expenditure will rise. If price
elasticity is exactly one (known as unit elasticity), a change in price produces no change in total expen-
diture.
82 BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 10, at 15-17.
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in the other activities potential plaintiffs undertake that influence their use
of courts over time. This is the same type of change observed in potential
travelers who adjust their living and working arrangements to incorporate
the availability of a new or expanded road. Likewise, underlying litigation
demand will change in character in response to the increased supply. The
change could be new suits (civil or criminal), redistribution of suits (e.g.,
from state to federal court or from one district to another), mode shift (e.g.,
litigation rather than mediation or plea bargaining), route shift (e.g., in-
crease in motions), or increases in bargaining breakdowns (e.g., individuals
negotiating contracts will recognize a decrease in costs of litigation and thus
will find certain present negotiations relatively more costly given probabili-
ties of disagreement).
Figure 4 reflects one possible state of the world following court expan-
sion. In the short term (period 1 to period 2), the price of litigation decreases
while the quantity increases. But over the longer term, individuals adjust
their demand to reflect the new state of the world, and the demand curve
shifts to the right. In the Figure 4 example, price in period 3 is higher than it
was prior to expansion. Courts are more congested, not less. Induced traffic
theory explains how underlying litigation demand can adjust such that court
congestion could be higher after expansion than it was before expansion.8 3
The demand curves in Figures 3 and 4 reflect changes only in response
to the price of litigation. The demand for litigation obviously is affected by
other factors as well.84 A change in other variables will produce a shift in
the demand curve so that the quantity demanded at each price will change.
One salient factor is the price of related goods, including substitutes or
complements. For example, the cost of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms ("ADR"), such as mediation or arbitration, should affect the
demand for litigation because ADR can provide a substitute for litigation.
If the price of ADR rises, then the demand for litigation should also rise
(i.e., the demand curve shifts out): Trial is substituted for an ADR process
like arbitration when the relative cost of arbitration increases.85 By contrast,
lawyers and litigation are complements because the two goods are con-
83 Other states of the world are possible. The demand curve may shift less (or more) than reflected
in Figure 4. If demand is less responsive than depicted, then courts will be less congested, although not
in direct proportion to the change in judicial supply.
84 One aspect of dispute resolution demand that lacks a clear parallel in the transportation context is
the effect of another party-defendants in disputes--on demand. While third-party factors certainly in-
fluence travel demand (e.g., employers' and store owners' decisions about where to locate, etc.), none
seem as direct and individualized as the impact of a defendant on a plaintiff or prosecutor's decision to
litigate. Of course, given the role of large entities in defending lawsuits in significant numbers, such as
insurance companies in the civil setting and the government in both civil and criminal cases, we might
be able to set aside this distinction in drawing the transportation-adjudication analogy.
85 Goods that are substitutes are marked by negative cross-price elasticity. See generally id. at 40.
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sumed together. If the contingency fee that lawyers charge rises, then the
demand for litigation should decrease (the demand curve shifts in). 6
B. Litigation Supply
The supply of state-sponsored adjudication, unlike demand, is not re-
sponsive to waiting-time price. The supply of judges and courts is fixed at
any point in time. Governments may decide to offer more or less adjudica-
tion in response to many factors, including tax receipts, interest group pres-
sures, congestion in the courts, and the like. But the willingness of litigants
to wait longer will not lead to a direct increase in court resources, although
these factors may influence the government's decisions about expanding or
contracting resources over time. Thus, the supply curve for litigation is com-
pletely inelastic-it is a vertical curve because the quantity of adjudication
supplied at a particular time is constant. 7 Figure 5, below, presents an up-
dated depiction of litigation supply and demand to reflect this.
Figure 5: Inelastic Litigation Supply and Shifts in Demand and Supply
Supply beforeP Demand I Period after expansion
ri expansion
C -Supply after
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Unlike the supply of market goods, the supply of government-provided
public goods-whether pure or impure--does not respond to market forces,
but rather responds to political ones. Political pressures often follow from
market factors, but they are filtered through the complex relationships of
86 See id. at 17-18; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 13, at 33, 109-10.
87 See BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 10, at 40. The (price) elasticity of supply is the percentage
change in quantity supplied divided by the percentage change in price. The elasticity of litigation supply
is zero, hence the supply curve is vertical. Id.
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elected officials with constituents, interest groups, bureaucrats, and other
elected officials.8 In the case of litigation supply, all the institutional fac-
tors are in play. 9 Because the supply is constant at any particular point in
time, the equilibrium price of litigation is set entirely by the supply curve.
If a government adds judges, then the supply curve would shift out-
ward-to the right-as reflected in Figure 5. Now, at every price, the quan-
tity supplied is equal to the pre-expansion number of judges plus the new
judges (i.e., QJ + new judges = Q2). The equilibrium price of litigation is
determined by the intersection of the demand curve and the new supply
curve (P2). The quantity of litigation, however, is wholly dependent on its
supply because supply is inelastic.9" By the second period following judi-
cial expansion, induced litigation has resulted in greater congestion (higher
price at P3) than existed prior to court expansion.
C. The Induced Litigation Model
An increase in the number of judges, and the resulting decline in adju-
dication delay, should lead to an increase in the number of lawsuits. Of
course, the demand for lawsuits comes from many potential sources. We
have to consider these other factors influencing demand in order to under-
stand the consequences of changes in court structure. Anyone considering
litigation--either the actual plaintiff or the attorney (including prosecu-
tors)-contemplates certain issues:91
* whether to pursue a dispute at all (or "dispute generation")?
* by which process (or "modal distribution")?
88 Consider, for example, the decision to split the Fifth Circuit as detailed in DEBORAH BARROW &
THOMAS WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL REFORM (1988).
89 See the following sources on the role of political factors in the expansion of the federal courts:
John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON. 435 (1996) (finding that po-
litical goals explained the timing of court of appeals expansion: the federal government is more likely to
add judges when both chambers and the executive are controlled by the same party (unified government)
and when it is expected that such unification will continue to the time of appointment (if the act takes
place in a period straddling presidential terms)); Jon R. Bond, The Politics of Court Structure: The Ad-
dition of New Federal Judges, 1949-1978, 2 L. & POL'Y Q. 181 (1980); McNollgast, Packing the Courts:
The Politics of Creating Federal Judgeships (on file with authors).
90 The government controls the price of litigation and thus the size of the consumer surplus, which
is the difference between what litigants would pay and do pay for litigation. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 13, at 114. Following the expansion of the court system, potential litigants seek more adjudi-
cation and pay a lower price, resulting in more consumer surplus. We can see this gain directly in Fig-
ure 5. The consumer surplus in time period I is reflected by the smaller right triangle formed by the
intersection of the demand curve with the y-axis and the PI price as the base. After the supply curve
shifts to the right (reflecting a greater quantity of litigation available), the price for litigation decreases to
P2. Consumer surplus in time 2 is the larger right triangle with the base at P2.
91 This discussion emulates Peter Hills's mathematical model of traffic. See Hills, supra note 47, at 15.
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* in which forum to file (or "jurisdiction shopping")?
" whether to litigate alone or with others (e.g., class action, joint
prosecution)?
* how often to litigate (or "litigation frequency")?
The answers to these questions, in turn, determine the demand for litigation.
Thus, a model of litigation levels would have to consider how these various
factors come into play.
The general induced litigation model would take the following form:
Cases filedi,t = P0 + ai 13k (Xi,tk) + X (pricei,t,i) + E
The parameters and variables are defined as follows:
Variable Definition
Cases filedi,t number of new civil suits filed in district i for
year t (dependent variable)
P30 constant term
ai a dummy variable for each district or jurisdiction i
13k coefficients for demographic and other explana-
tory (or independent) variables
Xi,tk value of demographic and other explanatory vari-
ables for district i in year t
X, coefficient for waiting-time price of litigation
pricei,t+i the waiting-time price of litigation in district i for
year t lagged by one year
random error term
The model explains the number of new civil suits filed in a given year
in a particular district (or court) as a result of the independent, or explana-
tory, variables on the right-hand side of the equation. The primary variable
of interest is the waiting-time price of litigation-this measures the induced
litigation effect. The variable is lagged one year to allow potential litigants
(or their counsel) to learn of any change in waiting-time price before mak-
ing a filing decision. The model also controls for other variables that may
explain changes in the level of civil filings, such as demographic shifts or
dramatic changes in legal rights. In order to control for jurisdiction-specific
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effects, the model controls for the identity of the court in a dummy vari-
able.92
This model of induced litigation-derived in part from theoretical and
empirical work on induced traffic in other domains-strongly suggests that
induced traffic is a phenomenon that affects not only the roadways but also
the courts.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF INDUCED TRAFFIC
Court reformers may face an unwelcome surprise if they allocate ad-
ditional resources to courts. Rather than facilitating the efficient resolu-
tion of existing cases, they might actually induce litigation. More
courthouses, more courtrooms, and more judges may simply mean that
more litigants bring their disputes to court. This raises important norma-
tive questions about society's investment in dispute resolution: If addi-
tional judicial resources will induce litigation, should court reformers
heed the calls of the Chief Justice93 and Judge Reinhardt94 for more judges
and more courts? Or should they turn a blind eye to the judicial elite and
hold resources constant to prevent increases in litigation rates? Might it
even make sense to contract judicial resources in an attempt to decrease
litigation? One's answers to the normative questions raised by this Essay
depend on one's view of the proper role of litigation in a constitutional
democracy.
A. Over-Litigation
One group of scholars and commentators-which we call the "private
ordering" group-focuses on the impure public good component of litiga-
tion. The members of this group contend that America is too litigious.
Beginning at least as early as 1970 and continuing to the present, mem-
bers of this group have complained about a "litigation explosion" in
American courts.95 In 1973, for example, Justice Warren Burger, one of
the early leaders of this group, warned of an "unprecedented explosion of
litigation" and claimed that "the number of cases filed and the number
tried and disposed of have undergone an explosive increase in the past ten
92 For an explanation of dummy variables, see ERIC A. HANUSHEK & JOHN E. JACKSON,
STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 101-08 (1977).
93 See supra note 2.
94 See supra note 1.
95 See Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81
TEX. L. REv. 285, 292 n.44 (2002) (claiming that the term "litigation explosion" first appeared in print
in 1970 and attributing it to Justice Macklin Fleming of the California Court of Appeals); Arthur R.
Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the 'Litigation Explosion, ' 'Liability Crisis, 'and Efficiency
Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 985 (2003)
("The contemporary perception of a crisis in the judicial system first became prominent in the 1970s.").
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years."96 More recently, former Vice President Dan Quayle and the Presi-
dent's Council on Competitiveness asserted that "America has become a
litigious society"97 with "one lawsuit for every ten adults."98  Arthur
Miller, a prominent observer of the civil justice system, described the "re-
cent outcry in this country over the social costs of litigation" as "unprece-
dented in its decibel level and sense of urgency."99
The private ordering group supports its claim that America is in the
midst of a litigation crisis by pointing to the dramatic rise in per capita case
filings."' In the state courts, for instance, the number of civil cases filed
from 1984 to 2000 increased by 30 percent, rising from 11,485,973 cases in
1984 to 14,957,085 in 2000."1 During this same time period, the population
increased by 19.5 percent, rising from 236.3 million in 1984 to 282.3 mil-
lion in 2000.102 As Figure 6 shows, civil case filings grew approximately 50
percent faster than the population.0 3
96 Warren Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1049, 1049 (1973).
97 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA
1 (1991) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL].
98 Id. (referring to 1989).
99 Miller, supra note 95, at 986.
100 See, e.g., Samuel Jan Brakel, Using What We Know About Our Civil Litigation System: A Cri-
tique of "Base-Rate" Analysis and Other Apologist Diversions, 31 GA. L. REV. 77, 88 (1996) ("Some
things cannot be denied. The steep rise in the number of cases filed in American courts in recent dec-
ades is one such thing."); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5
(1986) ("The core observation that supports the 'litigation explosion' or 'hyperlexis' reading of contem-
porary American life is that there is more litigation-that is, that more cases are filed in American
courts."); Miller, supra note 95, at 985 (observing that "the phenomenon described in the [litigation ex-
plosion] literature involves increasing rates of litigation").
101 These data are taken from the National Center for State Courts Court Statistics Project. See
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2000_TotalCaseloads.html; see also Brakel, supra note
100, at 139 ("New compilations from the National Center for State Courts document a 24% rise in civil
case filings between 1984 and 1994, a period during which the U.S. population grew roughly 10%.").
102 These data are taken from the online version of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, main-
tained by the U.S. Census Bureau, which is at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/ 02statab/pop.pdf.
National population figures (in millions) are as follows: 1984 - 236,348,000; 1985 - 238,466,000; 1986 -
240,651,000; 1987- 242,804,000; 1988- 245,021,000; 1989- 247,342,000; 1990- 250,132,000; 1991 -
253,493,000; 1992 - 256,894,000; 1993- 260,255,000; 1994 - 263,436,000; 1995 - 266,557,000; 1996-
269,667,000; 1997 - 272,912,000; 1998 - 276,115,000; 1999 - 279,295,000; 2000 - 282,339,000; 2001 -
285,024,000.
103 Here are the civil filings in state courts from 1984 to 2000: 1984 - 11,485,973; 1985 -
12,042,318; 1986- 12,605,549; 1987 - 12,916,756; 1988 - 13,399,310; 1989 - 13,751,592; 1990-
14,432,413; 1991 - 15,069,222; 1992 - 15,240,570; 1993 - 14,666,165; 1994- 14,520,921; 1995 -
14,739,442; 1996 - 15,074,509; 1997 - 15,385,638; 1998 - 15,408,397; 1999 - 15,122,241; 2000 -
14,957,085. See National Center for State Courts Court Statistics Project, supra note 101.
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Figure 6: Growth in State Civil Filings Compared to Population
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The growth in civil case filings has also been pronounced in the fed-
eral courts. From 1993 to 2002, the number of civil cases filed in federal
district courts increased by 21.5 percent, rising from 226,165 cases in
1993 to 274,841 cases in 2002."0 During this same period, the population
increased by approximately 10.8 percent, rising from 260.3 million in
1993 to an estimated 288.4 million in 2002. '0' As Figure 7 shows, civil
case filings grew at roughly twice the rate of the population during this
period. '
104 These data are taken from the U.S. Courts website at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/Judbus.
html. See also PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, supra note 97, at I (noting that the total number of cases filed in
federal district courts nearly tripled from 1960 to 1990, rising from 89,112 in 1960 to 251,113 in 1990);
WILLIAM P. MCLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 200 (1984) ("More and more cases are being
filed in or appealed to the federal courts as time goes by, and the rate of increase seems to be growing as
well.").
105 For population figures, see supra note 102. We use the term "approximately" because the U.S.
Census Bureau has only estimated the population through July 2002. See U.S. Census Bureau, Popula-
tion Estimates, at http://eire.census.gov/popest/estimates.php.
106 Here are the civil case filings in federal courts from 1993 to 2002: 1993 - 226,165; 1994 -
236,391; 1995 - 248,335; 1996 - 269,132; 1997 - 272,027; 1998 - 256,787; 1999 - 260,271; 2000 -
259,517; 2001 - 250,907; 2002 - 274,841. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts Website,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/Judbus.html.
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Figure 7: Growth in Federal Civil Filings Compared to Population
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The private ordering group views these statistics with alarm, arguing
that litigation imposes significant costs on society;"°7 threatens American's
competitiveness in the global marketplace;' 8 and reflects, reinforces, and
perhaps even causes tears in America's moral and social fabric. 9 From the
perspective of the private ordering group, society should not expand judicial
resources if it will induce litigation that would not otherwise arise. Rather,
society should deter disputants from filing suit and encourage them to re-
solve their disputes outside the courts.
B. Under-Litigation
Another group of scholars and commentators-which we call the "pub-
lic adjudication" group-focuses on the pure public good component of
107 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 100,
105-11 (2001) (arguing that "adversarial legalism makes American civil litigation especially costly, un-
predictable, and alienating" and describing some of these effects in detail); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, su-
pra note 97, at I (arguing that the "dramatic growth in litigation carries with it very high costs for the
U.S. economy"). For a general treatment, see WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT
HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
108 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 95, at 984 ("Critics maintain that excessive and frivolous litigation
overwhelms the judicial system's capacity to administer speedy and efficient justice, leads to higher
costs for litigants and society at large, and even hinders America's competitive position in the global
economy."); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 3 ("In a survey of over 250 American companies,
more than three-quarters of the executives said they believe that the United States will be increasingly
disadvantaged in world markets unless modifications are made in the liability system."). For a general
treatment, see OLSON, supra note 107.
109 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 100, at 5 ("It has become a commonplace that the United States is
the most litigious nation on earth, indeed in human history, and that excessive resort to law marks Amer-
ica's moral decline and portends painful political and economic consequence."). For a general treat-
ment, see OLSON, supra note 107.
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litigation. The members of this group contend that Americans are not liti-
gious enough. They do not advocate litigation for litigation's sake, but they
do contend that Americans often sit on their rights to their own detriment
and to the detriment of society. For the members of the public adjudication
group, the crisis in the courts is "a crisis of underclaiming rather than over-
claiming."" 0
The public adjudication group acknowledges that litigation rates have
risen on a per capita basis,"' but its members contend that "[r]ates per capita
are only a surrogate measure for the propensity to litigate."'1 2 To appreciate
whether individuals are overly litigious (as the private ordering group con-
tends) or insufficiently litigious (as the public adjudication group contends),
the public adjudication group argues that court reformers should look not at
the rate of per capita court filings, but rather at the rate of court filings relative
to injuries suffered." 3 That is, court reformers should measure the rate at
110 Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 447 (1987); see
also PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 140 (1993) (reporting that "our analysis of malpractice liti-
gation data demonstrates that the problem is not a litigation surplus, but a litigation deficit"); Michael J.
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1183 (1992).
One of the most remarkable features of the tort system is how few plaintiffs there are. A great
many potential plaintiffs are never heard from by the injurers or their insurers. The first and most
dramatic step in this process of nonsuits is the failure of so many of the injury victims to take
measures to obtain compensation from those who injured them.
Id.
III See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 100, at 5 ("Per capita rates of filing civil cases have risen in most
localities during recent decades."). Note, however, that this recent rise pales relative to litigation rates in
the past. Id. ("Before these increases are taken as proof of runaway litigiousness, it should be noted that
these rates are not historically unprecedented. Several studies document higher per capita rates of civil
litigation in nineteenth and early twentieth century America, as well as in colonial times."); see also
Galanter, supra note 95, at 285 ("A century ago, Americans invoked the civil courts more frequently on
a per capita basis than they do now.").
112 Galanter, supra note 100, at 5 n. 11; see also Saks, supra note 110, at 1211.
Why is population, and population alone, the statistical control used in trying to make sense of fil-
ings data? This adjustment strategy implicitly assumes that the number of injuries is a simple
function of the number of people - regardless of changes in age, economic condition, types of em-
ployment, and activities. Why is the appropriate control the number of people in each state rather
than the number of actionable injuries?
Id. 113 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 100, at 5 n.l I (observing that the propensity to litigate "depends
on the portion of occasions-troubles, injuries, problems, claims or however one characterizes instances
of possible litigation-that do lead to filings"); Saks, supra note 110, at 1173 ("Any assessment of
whether the propensity to sue is increasing, decreasing, or remaining the same can be made only in rela-
tion to the waxing or waning of the pool of injuries from which suits properly arise.").
Another problem with case filings as a measure of litigiousness is that they reflect not only the pro-
pensity of plaintiffs to sue, but also the tendency for defendants to resist resolving disputes short of liti-
gation. Galanter, supra note 100, at 7 ("A filing represents not only a claim but a refusal by the
defendant to satisfy it. Thus, we must be open to the notion that changes in the rate of filing may repre-
sent not only changes in plaintiff propensity to claim, but also changes in defendant propensity to re-
sist.").
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which individuals who have suffered potentially legally cognizable injuries
seek redress in the courts. How often, in other words, do those who have suf-
fered harms that the civil justice system might remedy actually go to court?
Studies show that Americans pursue only a fraction of potentially
meritorious claims in the courts. In perhaps the most famous claiming
study, William Miller and Austin Sarat contacted households by telephone
to inquire about potentially legally remediable injuries that their members
had suffered."4 They found that only 50 of every 1000 such instances re-
sulted in a lawsuit filing."5
Other researchers have reached similar conclusions. A study of malprac-
tice claims in the mid-to-late 1970s found that a maximum of 10 percent of
those who suffered an injury due to medical negligence filed claims." 6 In a
more recent malpractice study, a multi-disciplinary team of Harvard re-
searchers'17 evaluated medical practice in New York state hospitals and found
that "eight times as many patients suffer an injury from medical malpractice
as there are malpractice claims.""' 8 A broader RAND Institute survey of in-
dividuals with disabling injuries found that only nineteen of every one hun-
114 See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adver-
sary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525, 534-46 (1980-81); see also William L.F. Felstiner et al., The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & SOc'Y REV.
631 (1980-81) (showing generally how injurious experiences become grievances and disputes); David
M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 86-87 (1983) (using a dispute
pyramid to show the frequency of litigation).
115 Miller & Sarat, supra note 114, at 544. The researchers did observe some differences across dif-
ferent types of injuries. For example, only eight of 1,000 discrimination grievances resulted in a court
filing. Id. By contrast, 451 of 1000 post-divorce grievances resulted in a court filing. Id.
116 PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 23-
24(1985).
117 For a description of the participants, see WEILER ETAL.,supra note 110, at vii-xiv.
118 1 HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, THE REPORT OF THE
HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK ch. 7, at 1 (1990). Note that this
figure probably underestimates the actual claiming rate.
These aggregate estimates do not consider whether those who file claims, and sometimes those
who receive awards, might be judged as not having suffered adverse events from medical negli-
gence. When we identified the 47 malpractice claims actually filed by patients in our sample and
reviewed the judgments of our physicians, we found that even fewer than one in sixteen adverse
events with negligence produced litigation.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Troyen A. Brennan, An Empirical Analysis of Accidents and Accident
Law: The Case of Medical Malpractice Law, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 823, 848 (1992) ("[T]here is a huge
gap between negligent adverse events and claims. Even if we are as conservative as possible in our in-
terpretation of the matching results, we must conclude that fewer than one in twenty-five injuries caused
by substandard care produces litigation or a request for monetary damages.").
Like the victims of medical malpractice, consumers who believe they have purchased defective
products are also unlikely to assert claims. See Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response
to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Re-
dress, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 701, 712 (1977) (reporting that only 30.7 percent of consumers perceiving
problems voice complaints).
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dred of these injured citizens even contemplated seeking compensation for
their injuries and only two of them filed suit."9 Taken together, these and
other studies suggest "this country's citizens (and its lawyers) are not wan-
tonly litigious.' 12° Indeed, the number of lawsuits is "a thin shadow trailing
behind a fat number of injuries,''121 and there is little, if any, evidence "dem-
onstrating that the proportion of lawsuits to actionable injuries has grown
over the years.' 22
The public adjudication group is disheartened by the statistics on claiming.
For the members of this group, litigation is a valuable public good, and pro-
spective litigants who fail to pursue potentially meritorious claims deprive
themselves of remedies they deserve and deprive society of such collateral
benefits as justice, deterrence, greater clarity, and predictability in the law, and
so on. 23  The public adjudication group believes that society should provide
ample judicial resources to accommodate the potential demand for litigation.'24
C. Reconciling the Over and Under
The views of the private ordering group and the public adjudication
group may seem irreconcilable, but we believe that both groups are onto
119 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 122 (1991); see also Abel, supra note 110, at 450 (report-
ing that only "about half of road accident victims, somewhat fewer work accident victims, and hardly
any victims of other accidents, who are by far the largest category" ever file claims); Clermont &
Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 135.
Infinite experiences produce countless disputes, which yield few cases. For example, only a small
percentage of grievances ripen into claims, by the aggrieved's voicing the grievance to the injurer;
most aggrieved persons accept their injury, taking it as part of life or just figuring that no remedy
is available; tellingly, the theorists in this subject sometimes refer to acceptance as 'lumping it.'
Similarly, most disputants never make it to a lawyer, much less to a courthouse.
Id.
120 Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care Reform, 47 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1157, 1165 (1995) (citing HENSLER ET AL., supra note 119, at 123).
121 Saks, supra note 110, at 1166.
122 Miller, supra note 95, at 994-95.
123 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 100, at 34 (arguing that litigation "may encourage claimants and
lawyers to pursue claims of a given type. It may provide symbols for rallying a group, broadcasting
awareness of grievances, and dramatizing challenges to the status quo.").
124 See, e.g., Abel, supra note 110, at 454-55.
I believe that our enthusiasm for participation in politics, the market, cultural life, and social ser-
vices should extend to participation in the legal system. Litigation is an important form of politi-
cal activity: courts exercise political authority, modify substantive laws, and allocate resources.
Litigation also affects the economy, conveys information, alters prices, and corrects market imper-
fections. Litigation declares and changes fundamental cultural values. Additionally, litigants con-
sume a vital social service, since courts (and of course legislatures) are subsidized by the state.
Id.; see also Frank Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24-32 (2000) (argu-
ing generally that litigation is a public good particularly when it produces balanced precedents); Owen
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984) (arguing that adjudication should be under-
stood in "public terms," that it "is an institutional arrangement for using state power to bring a recalci-
trant reality closer to our chosen ideals" and that it "may help secure all that law promises").
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something. We agree with the public adjudication group that society should
encourage those individuals with important legal claims to pursue their
claims in court; we agree with the private ordering group, however, that so-
ciety should encourage other individuals to resolve their claims in less for-
mal ways. Thus, we believe that society should think about courts not in
isolation but rather as one of many dispute resolution processes that claim-
ants can use to seek redress for harms allegedly suffered. We support, in
other words, the erection of literal or figurative "multi-door courthouses"
containing "a flexible and diverse panoply of dispute resolution processes
(or combination of processes)" for disputants.'25 Several municipalities
have dealt effectively with their traffic problems by developing simultane-
ously their roadways and their mass transit systems;'26 likewise, society
should address its litigation traffic problems by carefully assessing the ap-
propriate supply of dispute resolution resources, not just judicial resources.
CONCLUSION
This Essay offers a cautionary tale for court reformers who assume that
demand for litigation is insensitive to its supply. In much the same way that
increases in the supply of roadways can induce demand for transportation,
increases in judicial resources can induce demand for litigation. Court re-
formers who ignore this phenomenon do so at their peril; in the spirit of the
"be careful what you wish for" adage, those who request more judicial re-
sources may get more lawsuits.
125 Sander, supra note 74, at 130-31 (advocating the adoption of multi-door courthouses).
126 See Robert T. Dunphy, Widening the Roads: Data Gaps and Philosophical Problems, 481
TRANSP. RES. CIRCULAR 16, 18-19 (1998).
HeinOnline  -- 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 578 2003-2004
